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Modern approaches to causal modeling give a central role to interventions, which require the
active input of an observer and introduces an explicit ‘causal arrow of time’. Causal models typically
adopt a mechanistic interpretation, according to which the direction of the causal arrow is intrinsic
to the process being studied. Here we investigate whether the direction of the causal arrow might
be a contribution from the observer, rather than an intrinsic property of the process. Working
within a counterfactual and non-mechanistic interpretation of causal modeling developed in Ref.
[1], we propose a definition of a ‘quantum observational scheme’ that we argue characterizes the
observer-invariant properties of a causal model. By restricting to quantum processes that preserve
the maximally mixed state (unbiasedness) we find that the statistics is symmetric under reversal of
the time-ordering. The resulting model can therefore accommodate the idea that the causal arrow
is observer-dependent, indicating a route towards reconciling the causal arrow with time-symmetric
laws of physics.
INTRODUCTION
There are many physical phenomena whose dynamics
are asymmetric along the time axis, providing ‘arrows
of time’ [2–4]. Among the least studied of these is the
causal arrow of time: an action we take at time t = T
always seems to have consequences on one side of the
co-ordinate time axis (that we label by convention with
increasing times t > T ), and never seems to have con-
sequences on the other side of that axis (labeled with
decreasing times t < T ) [3, 5–7]. This asymmetry cannot
be explained away by assuming that actions affecting the
past would lead to logical paradoxes, for non-paradoxical
accounts of backwards-in-time causation can readily be
found in philosophy [8], physics[9] and science fiction [10].
The origin of the time asymmetry of causality remains an
open question. [11]
This work aims to contribute to this big question by
asking a smaller question: is the perceived direction of
the causal influence intrinsic to the system, or is it a
relative property of how the observer interacts with the
system? The answer is not immediately obvious, be-
cause causal relations are ascertained by taking actions
on a system and observing the results, which requires
the participation of both the observer and the system.
We emphasize that what is at stake is not a metaphys-
ical question but a practical one: does the direction of
causality necessarily appear in an observer-independent
description of a phenomenon? If not, then we can de-
duce that it is a property that depends in some way on
the observer, either because it is a relative property of the
observer and the phenomenon, or because it is entirely
contributed by the observer. For example, the statue of
Aristotle in Thessaloniki has a rest-mass which may be
considered an intrinsic property of the statue, because
its value is the same regardless of how and by whom it
is measured. Its velocity is an observer-relative prop-
erty because it cannot be specified except in relation to
the velocity of the approaching tourist. Finally, the his-
tory of the statue is neither a property of the statue in
itself nor a property of its physical relation to us, but
rather is contained in records of our perceptions of the
statue. It is natural to wonder: is the perceived direction
of causality intrinsic like rest-mass, relative like velocity,
or is it part of the memory and perceptual apparatus of
the observer? Progress on this question can only be made
within a conceptual framework that gives ‘causality’ a
more precise meaning. One approach that has proven
to be successful in a wide range of scientific disciplines
is causal modeling [5, 12, 13]. In a causal model, there
are essentially two modes by which an observer may as-
certain causal relations. The first is called an observa-
tional scheme and represents a form of data collection
that is ‘passive’ in some appropriate sense, usually un-
derstood to mean that the system is unaffected by the
act of observation. The second mode of interaction is an
interventionist scheme in which the observer probes or
disrupts specific variables of the system and observes the
effect on the other variables. The conceptual difference
between these two modes of interaction may be likened
to the difference between observing a frog in a pond and
dissecting it on a table: generally, watching the frog in
the pond is sufficient to suggest some hypotheses about
how it functions, but cutting it up is really the only way
to know for sure. Perhaps because causal modeling has
its roots in engineering and the practical sciences, causal
models strongly favour the view that causal relations, like
the bones and musculature of the frog, are intrinsic to the
system. Even if the direction of a cause cannot be ascer-
tained from the observational scheme, it is presumed to
have some actual orientation that will be revealed once
the observer makes an intervention. Things become less
clear when the systems under question are quantum. As
we will see, the concept of an observational scheme be-
2comes essentially ill-defined for quantum systems. In the
face of this, a few authors have proposed to re-define an
observational scheme in a way that remains true to the
spirit of the classical definition [14, 15], however, these
attempts face conceptual difficulties [1, 15]. Many au-
thors simply abandon the idea, choosing instead to inter-
pret a quantum causal model purely within the setting of
an interventionist scheme [16–18]. Any formulation of a
causal model purely in terms of an interventionist scheme
denies us the means to separate the intrinsic from the
observer-dependent aspects of causality. It is therefore
necessary to propose a new definition of an observational
scheme suitable for quantum systems. This requires us
to abandon any notion of causality that presupposes a
mechanism, and reinterpret causality as a kind of rela-
tion between counterfactuals. For example, we can regard
the causal structure as a relation that enables us to de-
duce, from the frog’s movements in the pond, what would
happen if we were to take it into the lab and probe each
of its limbs separately. This view is compatible with a
mechanical interpretation of causality, but does not re-
quire it. In a longer companion work, a framework for
causal modeling was developed based on this alternative
interpretation of causality as relations among counter-
factual experiments [1]. The present work builds on that
framework by using it to motivate a definition of a quan-
tum observational scheme. It is shown that the prob-
abilities obtained in the observational scheme plus the
causal structure is sufficient to deduce what the prob-
abilities would be for arbitrary interventions on any of
the variables. In the special case of observations repre-
sented by ‘minimal’ quantum instruments, like those used
in Ref. [1], this result is found to hold if and only if the
causal structure has the form of a ‘layered’ DAG. This
result is proven using the process matrix definition of a
quantum causal model given by other authors in Ref.[16],
restricted to the minimal ‘SIC-instruments’ used in Ref.
[1]. I then ask what can be deduced from the quantum
observational scheme about the direction of causal influ-
ences in a system, without prior knowledge of the causal
structure. It is found that when the processes in ques-
tion are maximally-mixed-state preserving (unbiased), in
stark contrast to the classical case, there is no informa-
tion about the direction of causality available prior to
intervention. This implies that causal modeling of quan-
tum systems can be done in a way that does not require
a causal direction to be specified a priori, as is usually
assumed. It is therefore compatible with the notion that
the direction of causal influence is an observer-dependent
phenomenon, in line with the views expressed in eg. Refs.
[3, 7, 19].
FUNCTIONAL MODELS VERSUS CAUSAL
MODELS
To understand causal models it is helpful to start with
their conceptual predecessors: functional models.
Definition: A functional model is specified by a pair
{G,V} consisting of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G
with nodes corresponding to N variables V = {Vi : i =
1, 2, ..., N}; and a set of model parameters {ηi, Pi(ηi), fi :
i = 1, 2, ..., N} where ηi are independent random vari-
ables with probabilities Pi(ηi), and fi are deterministic
functions such that Vi = fi(paVi, ηi) where paVi denote
the parents of Vi in G.
In a functional model, probabilities for the variables V in
an observational scheme are obtained by a simple proce-
dure: one first samples a set of values from the Pi(ηi) and
then uses the functions fi(paVi, ηi) to progressively de-
termine the values of each Vi. The resulting distribution
obeys a special constraint, called the Causal Markov
Condition [5, 12, 20]:
Pobs(V) =
N∏
i=1
Pobs(Vi|paVi) . (1)
(Note that the form of this constraint depends on the sets
paVi and hence is relative to the DAG G). Conversely,
if some P (V) satisfies (1) relative to a DAG G, then
there exists a functional model which generates P (V) in
this way. Since functional models treat the concept of
‘causal relation’ as synonymous with ‘functional depen-
dence’, they also provide a direct way of formalizing the
notion of intervention on any variable Vj . Intuitively, an
intervention is a physical action on a dependent variable
Vj in a system that cuts off this variable from its causes
within the system, and allows it to be prepared in an ar-
bitrary state by the experimenter. In a functional model,
this is done by introducing an experimentally controlled
variable Xj and replacing fj(paVj , ηj) with the new de-
pendence fj(Xj). The arrows connecting paVj to Vj are
then deleted from the DAG. The probability distribution
generated from this intervened model also obeys a special
constraint:
Pinterv(V|do(Vj = xj)) = δ(Vj , xj)
∏
i6=j
Pobs(Vi|paVi) ,
(2)
where δ(Vj , xj) = 1 if Vj = xj and 0 otherwise, and
the notation do(Vj = xj) reminds us that we are forcing
Vj to the value xj by intervention, instead of passively
observing it. The collection of N such distributions, rep-
resenting interventions on each Vi, defines an interven-
tionist scheme. To make the further step to a causal
model, note that the form of both of the constraints (1),
(2) is independent of the particular choices of model pa-
rameters {ηi, Pi(ηi), fi} from which they were derived; in
fact, it only depends on the causal structure G. Hence,
3only G and Pobs are needed to describe observations at
the empirical level. In the companion work [1], this is
elevated to an axiom, called ‘causal sufficiency’. It is a
key property of causal models in our framework, because
it allows us to elevate the concept of causal relation to a
universal status that transcends mere mechanism.
Definition: A causal model is a pair {G,Pobs(V)},
where Pobs(V) satisfies the Causal Markov Condition (1)
relative to G, and the results of interventions are given
by the formula (2).
The importance of this step cannot be overstated. In a
functional model, causal structure was embodied in the
deterministic mechanisms fi(paVi, ηi), from which we de-
rived the constraints (1), (2). In a causal model, as we
interpret it here, this relationship is turned on its head:
the constraints (1), (2) are taken as postulates that serve
to define causal structure in terms of probabilities. This
can be made more precise by noticing that the RHS of
Eq. (2) is entirely determined by the probabilities from
the observational scheme, plus causal structure. That is,
‘causal structure’ merely codifies the precise way in which
data obtained in the observational scheme constrains the
data that would be obtained for any conceivable interven-
tion by an observer.
But what of the direction of causal influence? Curi-
ously, the Causal Markov Condition (1) is not invariant
under swapping the directions of all arrows in the DAG
G. This asymmetry is usually understood in terms of it’s
simplest manifestation in the case of two nodes V2, V3
having a single parent V1. In that case (1) is equiva-
lent to the factorization of V2, V3 conditional on V1, i.e.
P (V2, V3|V1) = P (V2|V1)P (V3|V1), which is often asso-
ciated with Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Causes
[21–23]. The asymmetry arises because reversing the di-
rection of causal arrows in the DAG makes V1 a common
effect of V2, V3, and (1) does not require factorization of
V2, V3 conditional on V1 – on the contrary, conditioning
on a common effect of two variables typically correlates
them, a result known in statistics as Berkson’s effect [24].
This makes it possible in many cases to deduce the di-
rection of causality purely from an observational scheme.
Traditionally, an observational scheme is formalized as a
method of making measurements that does not disturb
the system. This allows us to interpret Pobs(V) as rep-
resenting information about the system that would be
true even if nobody had observed the system, i.e. infor-
mation about the intrinsic properties of the system. It
follows that the direction of causality is most naturally
interpreted as one of the system’s intrinsic properties.
QUANTUM INTERVENTIONS AND
OBSERVATIONS
In the broadest sense, a quantum causal model is any
model that formalizes causal structure as a means of
encoding the consequences of possible interventions on
quantum systems. Unlike in the classical case, quantum
systems have only been known to us under highly con-
trolled laboratory settings. It is therefore natural that
the first attempts at causal modeling of these systems
have focused on finding a quantum generalization of the
interventionist scheme. These models can be summa-
rized by an equation analogous to (2) having the form of
a ‘generalized Born rule’ [7, 16, 25] :
P (V|x1, x2, . . . xN ) = Tr
[
Mx1v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
xN
vN
·W
]
.
(3)
In this expression, each Mxivi is the Choi-Jamio lkowski
matrix representation of a completely positive (CP) map
Mxivi (ρ) : H
in
Vi
7→ HoutVi , which represents the effect of set-
ting the control variableXi to the value xi, and obtaining
the outcome vi ∈ dom(Vi|xi) from the domain of possi-
ble values dom(Vi|xi) (note that this domain might be
different for different choices of xi). The set of CP maps
{Mxivi : vi ∈ dom(Vi|xi)} := M
xi
Vi
defines a quantum in-
strument, which replaces the classical notion of interven-
tion, and W is a positive semi-definite quantum process
matrix that maps arbitrary choices of quantum instru-
ments to probability distributions over the observed out-
comes V [16]. Conceptually this model treats causality
in much the same way as in a functional model, with W
standing in the role of the model parameters and where
causal structure refers to the structure of the quantum
process W from which constraints on the probabilities
are derived. This view implicitly supports interpretingW
(and hence the direction of causal influence) as a prop-
erty intrinsic to the system being probed. At least, if
one wishes to argue otherwise, it is necessary to supple-
ment this description with an observational scheme that
would allow us to define Pobs(V) as containing only the
observer-independent information.
The usual definition of an observational scheme in
terms of non-disturbing measurements is problematic for
quantum systems. On one hand, in order to perform in-
ference, the measurements need to be informative about
the system, but this implies that they disturb the state
of the system. This feature of quantum systems has been
formalized under the slogan “no information without dis-
turbance” [26]. Let us therefore re-evaluate the meaning
of an observational scheme by looking carefully at the
role it actually plays in a causal model. Two notable fea-
tures emerge. First, from Eq. (1) we see that the scheme
is passive in the sense that it requires no active choices
from the observer: there are no ‘control variables’, there
are only outcomes of a fixed set of measurements. Sec-
ond, from Eq. (2), we see that the data from the obser-
vational scheme plus the causal graph G is sufficient to
determine the results of an arbitrary intervention. This
latter feature points to an interesting new way of think-
ing about an observational scheme: not as a scheme that
reveals the system’s properties in absence of observation
4(as usually assumed), but as a scheme that indicates the
system’s behaviour in the presence of any observation.
The information obtained in such a scheme depends on
the fact of observation, but not the particular features
of the observation. It thus represents characteristics that
may be called intrinsic to the system, in the sense that
they obtain independently of which observation is made.
Thus, what gives causal relations their ‘objective’ charac-
ter in an observational scheme is not that we are taking a
view from nowhere, but rather that we are adopting the
view-point of no-one in particular [27]. Existing propos-
als for quantum observational schemes fail to meet both
of the above requirements exemplified in Eqs. (1), (2).
The informationally symmetric measurements proposed
in Refs. [14, 28], as well as the active quantum obser-
vational scheme in Ref. [15] both allow the observer to
actively choose which instruments to apply in each ex-
perimental run, hence are not passive. Both definitions
moreover have limited power to perform tomography of
the quantum process W , and hence cannot meet the sec-
ond requirement of enabling one to deduce the results of
an arbitrary intervention. We will now propose a defini-
tion of a quantum observational scheme that is passive in
the sense described above, i.e. that does not depend on
the active selection of control variables by an observer,
and show that complete tomography is possible with such
instruments. In order to give this definition, it is useful
to introduce the concept of an informationally complete
instrument. To do so, we use the fact that we can express
a CP map Mvi(·) in terms of its Kraus decomposition:
Mvi(·) =
∑
k
Ak,vi(·)A
†
k,vi
. (4)
In terms of this decomposition, for a given input state
ρ we may express the probability of outcome Vi = vi
and the corresponding post-measurement state as (re-
spectively):
P (Vi = vi) = Tr
[
ρ
(∑
k
A
†
k,vi
Ak,vi
)]
:= Tr [ρFvi ] ,
ρvi =
1
P (vi)
∑
k
Ak,vi(ρ)A
†
k,vi
. (5)
Informational completeness of the instrument
MVi := {Mvi : vi ∈ dom(Vi)} can be expressed
operationally by imagining a situation in which the
instrument is applied to an unknown state ρ and then
the output state from the instrument is subjected
to an unknown general measurement (POVM) {Bi}.
Informational completeness of MVi means that it must
be possible to completely reconstruct both ρ and {Bi}
from the set of probabilities P (Vi) of the instrument’s
outcomes. Formally, this is guaranteed by the following
conditions:
Definition: An informationally complete instrument
MVi is a quantum instrument with the properties that:
(i) The set of post-measurement states {ρvi : vi ∈
dom(Vi)} are linearly independent and span H
out
Vi
;
(ii) The set of POVM elements {Fvi : vi ∈ dom(Vi)} are
linearly independent and span HinVi .
We are now ready to give our first general definition
of a quantum observational scheme:
Definition: A quantum observational scheme assigns
to each variable Vi ∈ dom(Vi) a single informationally
complete instrument MVi := {Mvi : vi ∈ dom(Vi)},
which is fixed for all runs of the experiment.
It is important to mention that an informationally
complete instrument is not the same as an information-
ally complete set (IC-set) of instruments, which is some-
times mentioned in the literature [16, 29]. The latter
refers to a set of instruments {MxiVi : xi ∈ dom(Xi)}
targeted to a single variable Vi, which correspond to dif-
ferent possible settings of the control variable Xi that
may be varied in different experimental runs. The defin-
ing property of an IC-set is that when one applies such
a set to every variable Vi ∈ V, then the resulting con-
ditional probabilities P (V|x1, x2, . . . xN ) can be used to
perform complete tomography of the process W in Eq.
(3). By contrast, an informationally complete instru-
ment is a single instrument that cannot be changed be-
tween experimental runs, and so a set of such instru-
ments only produces a single set of ‘unconditioned’ prob-
abilities Pobs(V). Moreover, perhaps counter-intuitively,
these are in general not sufficient to perform complete
tomography of W , despite the fact that each individual
instrument is by itself informationally complete. This is
essentially the same problem that arises in attempting
to do tomography of non-Markovian processes; for more
details see eg. Ref. [30].
Fortunately, it turns out that any IC-set of instruments
for a given variable V can be converted into a single in-
formationally complete instrument on V [31]. Formally,
given an IC-set {MxV : x ∈ dom(X)}, we can define CP
maps
M(x,v)(·) := γ(x,v)M
x
v (·) (6)
indexed by tuples (X,V ) := {(x, v) : x ∈ dom(X), v ∈
dom(V |x)} where the coefficients γ(x,v) satisfy:
∑
x,v
γ(x,v) = 1 . (7)
It is then straightforward to check that the set of these
CP maps for all values of (x, v) defines a single quantum
5instrument:
M(X,V ) := {M(x,v)(·) : x ∈ dom(X), v ∈ dom(V |x)} ,
(8)
which is an informationally complete instrument for the
variable V . Intuitively, we can imagine constructing this
instrument from the IC-set by having, say, a machine
automatically select the value of the control variable X
according to some sampling distribution determined by
the coefficients γ(x,v).
Given an IC-set for each variable Vi, we can then use
the above construction to define a single informationally
complete measurement for each Vi, satisfying the require-
ments of a quantum observational scheme. Moreover, in
this case, the statistics Pobs(V) will be sufficient to per-
form complete tomography of W , by construction.
An interesting special case arises if we wish to insist
that the informationally complete instruments are
minimal :
Definition: An informationally complete instru-
ment MVi is called minimal if the input and
output Hilbert space dimensions are the same,
dim(HinVi) = dim(H
out
Vi
) := di, and the number of
possible values of Vi is equal to exactly d
2
i .
One example of such a scheme was recently discussed in
Ref. [1], where the instruments in question are symmetric
informationally complete (SIC) instruments. These are
defined by:
Mvi(·) =
1
di
Πvi(·)Πvi . (9)
where {Πvi : vi ∈ dom(Vi) are a set of d
2
i rank-1 projec-
tors satisfying:
Tr
[
ΠviΠvj
]
=
δijdi + 1
(d+ 1)
. (10)
The usage of such instruments was motivated in Ref. [1]
by the desire to make a quantum causal model that is
compatible with the ‘QBist’ interpretation of quantum
mechanics (see eg. Refs. [32, 33]). When the instruments
in a quantum observational scheme are restricted to be
SIC-instruments, we refer to this as a SIC-observational
scheme.
The restriction to instruments having only d2i pos-
sible outcomes places severe constraints on what can
be inferred about a general process matrix W using
only the statistics Pobs(V). In fact, complete recon-
struction of W from the observed probabilities in a
SIC-observational scheme will not be possible in general.
It might be hoped, however, that it is possible for a
suitably restricted class of processes W . Remarkably,
we will show that complete tomography of W is possible
in a SIC-observational scheme if we merely restrict the
causal structure of the process:
Result 1: Tomography of a general process matrix
W compatible with the causal structure G is possible in
a SIC observational scheme if and only if G is a layered
DAG (proof in Appendix A).
(Definition: A DAG G on a vertex set V is said to be
layered if the nodes can be partitioned into K subsets or
‘layers’ V = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ · · · ∪ LK such that no member of
a layer is a cause of any other member of the same layer,
and such that for any triplet Li,Lj ,Lk with i < j < k,
each path connecting Li to Lk is intercepted by Lj ,
i.e. contains a causal chain A → B → C whose middle
member B is in Lj).
In order to uphold the key property of causal models
– that the observational scheme should be sufficient to
indicate what happens under an arbitrary intervention
– it is therefore necessary and sufficient that the causal
structure in a SIC-observational scheme should be layered
as described above.
A further assumption that has been proposed in the
literature is that W should be an unbiased process
[14, 15], i.e. it should preserve the maximally mixed
state. The standard reason for making this assumption
is that it enables a more natural comparison between
quantum and classical causal models when seeking to
establish a quantum advantage for causal inference.
However it also has an alternative motivation: in Ref.
[1] it was shown that the quantum generalization of
the Causal Markov Condition for unbiased quantum
processes is causally reversible, that is, the condition is
invariant under reversal of all arrows in the causal graph
G. Here, we extend this result by proving the following:
Result 2: If the DAG ofW is layered and the process
W is unbiased, then the probabilities Pobs(V) obtained
in a SIC-observational scheme are causally reversible,
that is, they are compatible with a quantum process
whose DAG G∗ is obtained by reversing the directions
of all arrows in G (proof in Appendix B).
It is interesting to propose that the causal structure
of quantum systems might be represented at the funda-
mental level by a SIC-observational scheme with a lay-
ered DAG. Under this assumption, it would follow that
the direction of the causal arrows cannot be ascertained
from Pobs(V) alone. Thus, according to the arguments
put forth in this paper, we should not regard this di-
rection as an observer-invariant property of the system
whose causal structure is described by the model. The
direction of causality, we must suppose, is only revealed
(or, perhaps more provocatively, produced) when an in-
tervention is performed by a particular observer. This
suggests that a time-symmetric description of the funda-
6mental laws of physics may yet be compatible with the
apparent asymmetry of the causal arrow of time.
It is natural to wonder what happens if one instead
restricts all instruments to be projective measurements
in a single basis, thereby obtaining the ‘classical limit’ of
a quantum causal model as defined in Ref. [16]. In this
case, one would expect that the restriction to unbiased
processes should lead to a causally reversible classical
causal model. Such a model may represent a generaliza-
tion of time-reversible Markov chains to arbitrary causal
structures – the investigation of this possibility is left to
future work.
We remark in closing that the related work of Ref. [7]
has shown that time-symmetric causality can be recov-
ered by relaxing the constraints on quantum dynamics to
allow for more general processes. Here, we have shown
that symmetry can also be restored by restricting quan-
tum dynamics to unbiased processes. In this sense, our
work provides a complementary perspective on how time-
symmetry of the causal arrow can be restored in quantum
mechanics.
In conclusion, we have shown that it is possible to de-
fine a quantum observational scheme for arbitrary quan-
tum processes, where the instruments are fixed for all
runs of the experiment. More interestingly, we found
that when the instruments are required to be minimal
as in a SIC-observational scheme, the causal structure
must be layered for complete tomography to be possi-
ble from the observed probabilities alone. Finally, we
showed that under the restriction to unbiased processes,
the model is causally reversible. Thus, the present work
allows for the possibility that the observer has a funda-
mental role in determining the direction of causality in a
system. The task of explaining exactly how this comes
about remains an interesting open question. In partic-
ular, it would be interesting to investigate whether the
causal arrow is grounded in purely physical relations be-
tween observer and system, or whether it depends on
more complex properties of the observer, such as their
ability to perceive and store information.
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Appendix A: Proof of Result 1
Claim: Tomography of a general process matrix W
which is compatible with a given causal structure repre-
sented by a DAG G is possible in a SIC- observational
scheme if and only if G is a layered DAG. To prove this
claim, we interpret compatible to mean that W factor-
izes over the DAG G as defined in Ref. [16]. This will
be explained below.
We first prove the ‘if’ part. Let the nodes of G be
partitioned intoM sets Y1∪Y2∪ ...∪YK corresponding
to the layers of G (we use ‘Y’ here instead of L because
the lowercase ‘l’ risks being confused with ‘1’ and ‘I’).
LetH
Ij
Yj
be the combined input Hilbert space of all nodes
in the layer Yj , and similarly let H
Oj
Yj
be the combined
output Hilbert space from that layer. Then any process
matrix W that factorizes over the DAG G has the form
[16]:
W =W I1 ⊗WO1I2 ⊗ ...⊗WOK−1IK ⊗ IOK , (11)
where IOj is the identity operator on H
Oj
Yj
. The proba-
bilities for a SIC-observational scheme are now obtained
from the generalized Born rule (3), by substituting in
the SIC-instruments M˜Vi for each node. Let us define
M˜yj as the CP map on H
Ij
Yj
corresponding to the vec-
tor of values yj := {vi} obtained for all nodes in the
layer Yj . Then the set of these maps for all sets of val-
ues yj defines a quantum instrument on the entire layer,
M˜Yj := {M˜yj : yj ∈ dom(Yj)}, which is also infor-
mationally complete. We can now write the observed
probabilities from the SIC-observational scheme as:
Pobs(y1,y2, ...,yK) = Tr
[
M˜y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ M˜yK ·W
]
.
(12)
The definition of a SIC-instrument implies that the
Choi-Jamio lkowski matrices M˜yj have the general form:
M˜yj = Π
Ij
yj ⊗ F
Oj
yj , (13)
where
Πyj :=
⊗
vi∈Yj
Πvi
Fyj := βyj Πyj
βyj :=
∏
vi∈Yj
βvi . (14)
In fact, for SIC-instruments we have βvi :=
1
di
and
the projectors Π satisfy the overlaps in Eq. (10), how-
ever, these properties of SICs are not relevant to our
present analysis. The present proof actually applies for
any quantum instruments that are minimal and whose
POVM elements are rank-1 projections.
Continuing our analysis, note that the set of opera-
tors FYj := {Fyj : yj ∈ Yj} automatically forms an
informationally-complete POVM for the whole layer. In-
serting these operators and the factorized process from
(11) into (12), we obtain:
Pobs(y1,y2, ...,yK) = Tr
[
F I1y1 ·W
I1
1
]
×
K∏
j=1
Tr
[
Π
Oj
yj ⊗ F
Ij+1
yj+1 ·W
OjIj+1
]
= P (y1)P (y2|y1), ..., P (yK |yK−1) ,
(15)
where
P (yj+1|yj) = Tr
[
Π
Oj
yj ⊗ F
Ij+1
yj+1 ·W
OjIj+1
]
(16)
is the conditional probability to obtain yj+1 when mea-
suring the POVM FYj+1 on the layer Yj+1 given that
the outcome yj was obtained on the previous layer Yj .
Since {Π
Oj
yj ⊗F
Ij+1
yj+1} form a set of rank-1 projectors that
spans the space of linear operators L(H
Oj
Yj
⊗H
Ij+1
Yj+1
), the
probabilities P (yj+1|yj) are sufficient to reconstruct an
arbitrary sub-processWOjIj+1 , and hence using Eq. (15)
we can reconstruct the full process W from the observed
probabilities Pobs(V).
For the ‘only if’ part of the proof, first note that for any
DAG G the nodes can be partitioned into sets {Sj} such
that there is a directed path from a member of Si to
Sj whenever j > i, and no directed paths between any
members of the same set. As with layers, one can define
the rank-1 projectors Πsj that together span the space
of linear operators on the joint Hilbert space of all the
nodes in the set Sj . Now, if G is not a layered DAG, then
there must exist three sets Sj′ ,Sk′ ,Sl′ with j
′ < k′ < l′
such that there is a path from Sj′ to Sl′ that does not
intersect Sk′ . Without loss of generality, we can choose
the specific labels j′ = 2, k′ = 3, l′ = 4. Then the fac-
torization condition from Ref. [16] for the DAG implies
that W has the form:
W =W<2 ⊗W
O2I3O3I4 ⊗W>4 , (17)
where by assumption WO2I3O3I4 cannot be further de-
composed. Substituting this into (12) we obtain a fac-
torization of Pobs(V) into a product of terms, which con-
tains the term:
P (s4 s3|s2) =
Tr
[
ΠO2s2 ⊗ F
I3
s3
⊗ΠO3s3 ⊗ F
I4
s4
·WO2I3O3I4
]
.
8NowWO2I3O3I4 is a linear operator in the space L(HO2S2 ⊗
HI3S3 ⊗H
O3
S3
⊗HI4S4), for which a spanning set of operators
must have at least (d2d
2
3d4)
2 elements, with dj the dimen-
sion of the joint Hilbert space HSj associated to the set
Sj . However, the set of projectors {Fs2⊗Fs3⊗Fs3⊗Fs4}
for all sets of values of s2, s3, s4 is required to have
(d2d3d4)
2 elements in order to satisfy the requirement
of being minimal, and so will in general not be sufficient
to reconstruct the sub-process WO2I3O3I4 from the ob-
served probabilities. This concludes the proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Result 2
Claim: If the DAG of W is layered and the process W
is unbiased, then the probabilities Pobs(V) obtained in a
SIC-observational scheme are causally reversible, that is,
they are compatible with another quantum process W¯
whose DAG G∗ is obtained by reversing the directions
of all arrows in G.
To be more precise, our goal is to show that if Pobs(V)
factorizes as shown in Eq. (15), where each WOjIj+1 is
a valid unbiased quantum process representing a CPT
map from from H
Oj
Yj
to H
Ij+1
Yj+1
, then Pobs(V) must also
factorize in the reverse order:
Pobs(V) = P (y1|y2), P (y2|y3), ..., P (yK−1|yK)P (yK) ,
such that each term can be expressed as:
P (yj |yj+1) = Tr
[
Π
Oj+1
yj+1 ⊗ F
Ij
yj · W¯
Oj+1Ij
]
,
where W¯Oj+1Ij is a valid quantum process matrix rep-
resenting a CPT map from from H
Oj+1
Yj+1
to H
Ij
Yj
. First,
note that the factorization of (18) can be obtained di-
rectly from (15) by applying the standard formula for
Bayesian inversion to each term:
P (yj+1|yj) =
P (yj+1)
P (yj)
P (yj |yj+1) .
Next, comparing (18) to (16), we see that the Claim is
fulfilled only if we define
W¯Oj+1Ij :=
{
WOjIj+1
}
I↔O
P (yj)
P (yj+1)
βj+1
βj
, (18)
where {. . . }I↔O means re-labeling the Hilbert spaces to
switch their roles as ‘input’ and ‘output’ from their re-
spective layers. It is important to note that a process
which is a valid CPT map for one choice of input/output
labelling will not in general be a valid CPT map when the
input/output labels are switched: this is just the math-
ematical manifestation of the ‘causal arrow of time’ for
quantum processes[6, 7]. As a simple example, consider
a quantum channel from the output of Alice’s laboratory
(HOA) to the input of Bob’s laboratory (HIB ) that dis-
cards Alice’s output and produces a fixed pure state |ψ〉
at Bob’s input. This is represented by the process ma-
trix WOAIB = IOA ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|IB . Now consider the matrix
obtained by switching the input and output:
W¯ IAOB := {WOAIB}I↔O = I
IA ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|OB .
The Hilbert spaces are the same, but their roles are re-
versed: W¯ IAOB is now to be interpreted as a map from
the output of Bob’s laboratory to the input of Alice’s lab-
oratory. However, under this interpretation it does not
represent a valid quantum process because
TrIA
[
W¯OBIA
]
= |ψ〉〈ψ|OB 6= IOB ,
Tr
[
W¯OBIA
]
= dIA 6= dOB . (19)
Qualitatively, the first property means the map forces
the output of Bob’s lab to be |ψ〉〈ψ|OB (regardless of
Bob’s efforts to produce something else) and hence rep-
resents a case of ‘deterministic post-selection’ of Bob’s
output, which is not allowed by quantum theory. (In-
deed, the assumption that there can be no deterministic
post-selection is often called causality in the literature
[7, 34]). The second property shows that the state pro-
duced at Alice’s input is IIA , which is not normalized.
More generally, the conditions for any process matrix to
represent a valid CPT map from H
Oj
Yj
to H
Ij+1
Yj+1
are given
by [25]:
WOjIj+1 ≥ 0 ,
TrIj+1
[
WOjIj+1
]
= IOj ,
Tr
[
WOjIj+1
]
= dOj . (20)
Notice that these conditions are not symmetric under a
re-labelling of O ↔ I, and hence it matters which Hilbert
space is interpreted as the ‘output’ of the preceding layer
(hence the input to W ) and which is the ‘input’ to the
next layer (hence the output from W ). It is therefore
important to verify whether the matrix W¯Oj+1Ij defined
in (18) represents a valid quantum process. As we now
show, this is guaranteed if the original process WOjIj+1
is unbiased, which means it satisfies the additional con-
straint:
TrOj
[
WOjIj+1
]
=
dj
dj+1
I
Ij+1 . (21)
The conditions for W¯Oj+1Ij to be a valid CPT map from
H
Oj+1
Yj+1
to H
Ij
Yj
are given by:
W¯Oj+1Ij ≥ 0 ,
TrIj
[
W¯Oj+1Ij
]
= IOj+1 ,
Tr
[
W¯Oj+1Ij
]
= dOj+1 . (22)
To prove that these conditions are met, we first simplify
the expression (18) using the fact that WOjIj+1 is unbi-
ased. Since the initial term W I11 of (11) can be thought
9of as a process from a trivial Hilbert space (with dimen-
sion d = 1) to the space HI1Y1 , the condition (21) implies
thatW I11 =
1
d1
I
I1 . Next, we note that if one marginalizes
over the outcome vi of an SIC-instrument (actually any
minimal instrument with projective elements), the result
is a CPT map that is automatically unbiased:∑
vi
M˜vi(I) =
∑
vi
βviΠvi (I)Πvi
=
∑
vi
βviΠvi = I . (23)
The above two results imply that for an unbiased process
W with a layered DAG, the marginal probability for the
outcome set yj in a given layer Yj (i.e. after summing
over the outcomes obtained in all other layers) is equal
to the probability of obtaining yj when measuring the
maximally mixed state, that is:
P (yj) = Tr
[
1
dj
I · Fyj
]
=
βj
dj
. (24)
Substituting this into (18) we obtain the simpler expres-
sion:
W¯Oj+1Ij :=
{
WOjIj+1
}
I↔O
dj+1
dj
. (25)
Since
dj+1
dj
> 0, the first condition of (22) is immediately
met. For the second condition, with the help of (21), we
find:
TrIj
[
W¯Oj+1Ij
]
= TrIj
[{
WOjIj+1
}
I↔O
] dj+1
dj
=
{
TrOj
[
WOjIj+1
]}
I↔O
dj+1
dj
=
{
dj
dj+1
I
Ij+1
}
I↔O
dj+1
dj
= IOj+1 , (26)
and
Tr
[
W¯Oj+1Ij
]
=
{
Tr
[
WOjIj+1
]}
I↔O
dj+1
dj
= (dj)
dj+1
dj
= dj+1 (27)
and hence all conditions (22) are met. We conclude
that W¯Oj+1Ij is a valid process representing a CPT map
from H
Oj+1
Yj+1
to H
Ij
Yj
. Since the complete reverse process
formed by
W¯ := IO1 ⊗ W¯O2I1 ⊗ ...⊗ W¯OKIK−1 ⊗ IIK , (28)
clearly factorizes over the reversed DAG G∗, this com-
pletes the proof.
